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In this thesis I examine anarchism and virtue ethics and their relationship with each other through the 
virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre and virtue ethically informed practical anarchism of Benjamin 
Franks. MacIntyre’s now classic book of After Virtue where he presents his influential revival of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics serves as a route for Franks’ effort to explicitly combine the political theory 
of anarchism with virtue ethics. MacIntyre’s theory puts emphasis on practices as the most salient 
feature of virtue ethics in contrast to other characteristics of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and his overall 
philosophical theory, such as justification of slavery and systematic subordination of women, which 
are redolent of his metaphysical biology. Defining virtue ethics as practice-oriented and stressing the 
consistency between means and ends, i.e. prefiguration, of actions enables MacIntyre to offer virtue 
ethics as a suitable alternative to alleged moral confusion brought by Enlightenment inspired moral 
philosophies of utilitarianism and deontology. For Franks practice-oriented virtue ethics has 
considerable amount of resemblance with anarchism’s ethical commitment to prefiguration both 
historically, exemplified by anarchists’ disagreement with Marxists during the First International over 
the use of state apparatus during revolutionary struggle, and contemporarily, as in the anarchist-
influenced Occupy Movement. Based on MacIntyre and Franks’ theories I come to identify the 
question of essentialism, i.e. what is the essence of our existence, as difficult for both of them and in 
 more generally for the philosophical traditions of anarchism and virtue ethics. I argue for the 
implementation of materialism to remedy inadequacies found both in MacIntyre’s later era Thomism, 
and Franks’ theoretical weakness for proper justification to the reason why one ought to accept and 
adopt anarchist position. I also come to claim that materialism, as in drawing focus on the material 
constitution of our being and environment, offers invaluable resources beyond anarchism and virtue 
ethics to the general discourse of political and moral philosophy. 
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In this thesis I will inquiry the relation between virtue ethics and anarchism, and particularly, what 
one should think about essentialism and its place in the context of these doctrines, and by extension 
more generally about essentialist claims concerning the nature of human condition. Impetus for such 
a work comes, firstly, from the interest and affinity I have for anarchism and other closely associated 
socialist movements and philosophies, and secondly, from the intriguing questions of what kind of 
(meta-)ethical alignment should such of a libertarian socialist philosophy have and why. While 
inquiring into these questions I have found myself wandering into philosophical terrains which one 
could regard to be quite far off from my starting point of anarchism and virtue ethics, or social and 
moral philosophy in general, into the ontological question of essence. In the text below I wish I have 
done enough to justify my wide approach as necessary in order to answer such questions, at least 
tentatively, in a satisfactorily manner. Next, I shall briefly define the key terms: anarchism, virtue 
ethics and essentialism. Then, I outline the order in which I present my argument before I move on to 
actual chapters of this work. 
 
Anarchism is a political ideology which maintains that human communities should be organised to 
be classless, moneyless and stateless entities, and the means by which that aim would be brought 
about should already embody that desired outcome. Therefore anarchism does have same goals as 
communism, but disagreement has risen, historically and theoretically, from the methods being 
employed to achieve the common goal (Franks 2010, 145) since communism has put emphasis on the 
gaining the control of the state apparatus through elections in the representative democracy, or seizing 
the control of the state apparatus in a revolution, which also has been endorsed by anarchists, but 
whereas anarchists would seize the state apparatus only to dissolve it, communists would use the state 
apparatus to their ends by ruling as a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ until state will ‘wither away’. 
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This is the crux of the disagreement between anarchists and Marxists to put it in simplified terms. 
Anarchism, particularly nowadays, is characterised by opposing all hierarchies, whether they be 
political, economic, cultural etc. with an acknowledgement that nature of such an endeavour is 
‘ongoing process of contesting and reducing oppression rather than the utopian ideal of destroying 
oppressive structures and relations once and for all’ (Jun 2010, 59). In this work I concentrate on 
Benjamin Franks’ conception of anarchism which is in continuity with the working-class origins of 
the anarchistic movement while incorporating some key elements of later influences, such as post-
structuralism. Franks’ view represents for the most parts the majority of anarchistic community, both 
academic and activist. By this I mainly mean that anarchism is still regarded widely as a working-
class, anti-capitalistic movement contrary to some claims of anarchism to be regarded as something 
of an ultra-capitalism or anarcho-capitalism1. In this work I will not address the debate whether 
anarchism and capitalism are compatible. Anarchism is understood in this work, as mentioned earlier, 
with respect to its historical roots as a movement of the working-class with explicit commitment to 
opposing all hierarchies whatever they are.   
 
Virtue ethics is one of the three classical moral theories of philosophy alongside Kantian, or 
deontological ethics, and consequentalist, usually presented in its utilitarian form, ethics. Virtue ethics, 
which originates from Ancient Greece and its most celebrated philosophers Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle, presents a view of life in which living well or virtuously is to live according to one’s 
teleological goal which is dictated based on person’s metaphysical biology, to use MacIntyre’s term 
(see e.g. 2007/2014, xi). Virtues are dispositions which are practised so that one can lead a good life 
and apply those learned life skills, which virtues are, in their everyday lives. In this work I use 
Alasdair MacIntre’s virtue ethical theory mainly because it provides the foundation for Benjamin 
Franks’ conception of anarchistic virtue ethics. 
                                                 
1 Franks (2012, 210, 224) uses the term ‘propertarianism’ while referring to such ideological constellations, like anarcho-
capitalism, which values property as the primary or one of the primary features, thus distinguishing it from anarchism as 
understood here as a part of the socialist tradition. 
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Essentialism is a view about human essence that humans indeed have essence, and which 
characteristically determines our direction and aim in life. This is closely linked to the aforementioned 
thinkers of Ancient Greece and via their influence also to Christianity, amongst other strands of 
thought. I shall discuss essentialism in the context of MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, and essentialism in 
the form of materialism is a central part of my argument in the later chapters of this work.  
 
I begin my argument by presenting overview of MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, which is in later chapters 
more fully articulated in discussion with Franks’ theory and my own theoretical position. After 
presentation of MacIntyre’s key concepts, I move on to Franks’ theory of anarchism and its relation 
to MacIntyre. Then, I discern the problematic issue for both MacIntyre and Franks, also by extension 
to virtue ethics and anarchism in general, that of essentialism, and formulate my proposed amendment 
to Franks’ theory aiming to resolve issue arising in it in relation to his stance on essentialism. In later 
stages of this work I address some possible points of criticism which can be brought against my 
position and what kind of further inquiry should be undertaken in the future concerning the connection 
between anarchism, materialism and virtue ethics. 
 
2. Overview of MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics 
 
Ever since the publication of After Virtue in 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre (1929-) has been one of the 
leading moral philosophers of the latter part of 20th century and the early 21st century. In After Virtue 
(1981/2014) MacIntyre vehemently criticised modern moral philosophy and the Enlightenment which 
produced it. In place of the failing modern moral philosophy MacIntyre suggested going back the 
virtue ethics of ancient Greece, especially Aristotle (384-322 BCE), and medieval Catholic doctrine 
of Thomism as developed by Thomas of Aquinas (1225-1274). In this chapter I will present the 
MacIntyre’s virtue ethical account before his conversion to Thomism around the turn of 1990s, since 
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it is the most relevant part of his thought for Benjamin Franks’ anarchistic virtue ethics. I will, also, 
address in later stages of this work his subsequent Thomism. 
 
After Virtue (1981/2014) is in many respects critique of Enlightenment moral philosophies, 
deontology and utilitarianism, and their failed quest to bring rational grounding for morality, as shown 
by the extensive discussion devoted to them in the early chapters (see esp. chap. 2-6) while setting up 
for his later claims for vindicating Aristotelian virtue ethics. MacIntyre castigates Enlightenment 
moralities and their modern applications, such as the most fashionable ethical stand of his own student 
days, emotivism, of  their habit of using earlier ethical concepts such as virtue in ways which have 
distorted them and cause confusion when they are widely used in moral debates with conflicting and 
contradictory ways. Furthermore, this fervent search for rational fundamental moral principles has, 
according to MacIntyre, displaced virtue ethics from its place as moral theory which gave sufficient 
rational grounds for action and intellectual tools for moral evaluation in ethical inquiry. MacIntyre 
stresses the social embeddedness of life against atomic individuals of liberal conceptions of social 
life derived from Enlightenment. While overall MacIntyre’s thinking has changed significantly and 
he has endorsed variety of philosophies ranging from Marxism to Thomism, he has retained certain 
elements throughout his career. Perhaps the most enduring is his aversion to liberalism, the ideology 
whose roots one can trace back to the Reformation in the 16th century of Christianity and 
Enlightenment of 18th century and the subsequent emerging of modern-day capitalism made possible 
by the Industrial Revolution in the turn of the 19th century. One can see that during that beginning of 
liberalism’s formulation his later-era favoured position of Thomism and its close companion of 
Catholicism began wane on its influence, philosophically and politically. In any case, MacIntyre’s 
project has its impetus very much on the disappointment created by liberal moral philosophies, as 
well as vacuous moral content of his once endorsed Marxism during the Soviet-era, evidenced by the 
preface to the first edition of After Virtue (1981/2014, xviii-xx) leading him to seek an alternative 
understanding of morality from an earlier era of Ancient Greece. 
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MacIntyre (1981/2014) argues following Aristotle that in order to lead a good life, i.e. to flourish as 
a human being, one must act virtuously, according to virtues. Virtues are dispositions to act and are 
something which can and should be learnt. Although virtues are possessed individually, they are 
inherently social, since humans learn about virtues from other people and in practise virtues are 
displayed in everyday social relationships and interactions with others, even if some virtues might 
have requirements exclusively or almost exclusively towards oneself, such as self-discipline, or have 
both private and public side, for example being honest to yourself and others. MacIntyre bases his 
practice-oriented virtue ethics on Aristotle’s ideas of praksis and poieis while describing two modes 
of acting (Nicomachean Ethics, VI chap. 2-5). Aristotle’s (Ibid., I chap. 5) insistence that happiness, 
eudaimonia, cannot be reduced to wealth, honour or pleasure imply for MacIntyre (1981/2014, 174) 
that virtues enable, indeed are necessary for, successful undertaking of practices which constitute the 
ultimate goal of eudaimonia, even if Aristotle does not himself make such of a connection of means 
and ends internal relationship to each other, MacIntyre (Ibid., 214-215) claims that such of a 
connection is relevant to understand what Aristotle meant, and this is something which Aquinas 
already acknowledged, which also is simultaneously concretely achieved through virtuously practices 
as well as in abstract teleological aim of divine bliss, although such supernatural state has a very 
different meaning for Aristotle then it has for Aquinas. Acknowledging that Aristotle did not 
formulate a detailed account of practices, MacIntyre nevertheless claims that such of an account is 
possible to devise based on his theoretical discussion of praksis and poieis, as well from his examples 
of such an activity like playing the flute. 
 
John Horton and Susan Mendus discern three key concepts which underlie MacIntyre’s theory: 
narrative, practices and tradition (Horton & Mendus 1994, 8). For MacIntyre human life is socially 
and narratively constructed and not as modernists, of which MacIntyre takes Jean-Paul Sartre, or to 
be more precise the protagonists of his literary works, to be a prime example, who make constantly 
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decisions, according to MacIntyre, in disjointed manner without references to their personal history 
or social context in which they make such decisions (MacIntyre 1981/2014, 248-249). Narratively 
constructed lives are, because of their social embeddedness, at least partially roles which already exist 
prior to individual and demand individual to perform certain roles in certain situations, for example 
a child in early stage of one’s life or a parent in later stage of life. This is contrary to the modernist 
outlook in which, MacIntyre claims, individual constantly re-establishes oneself as chooser and 
decider what one wants to do without regard for the social context in which one lives. (Horton & 
Mendus 1994, 8-9.) 
 
Secondly, MacIntyre understands morality as a practice-based activity in which moral goods which 
one achieve by acting virtuously are internal to the practice. MacIntyre definition of practice is 
following:  
 
“By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended.” (MacIntyre 1981/2014, 218)  
 
As examples of what MacIntyre considers to be practices he names activities ranging from chess and 
farming to biology and building a community (Ibid., 218-219). These practices are evaluated by the 
standards internal to the successful performing of the practice and practice itself informs of such 
criteria whether one is practising it virtuously or not, for example in the case of chess it is the rules 
of the game of chess which constitute whether one is playing well. Evaluation criteria differs from 
one practice to another but one always needs various virtues to perform different practices 
successfully. Means and ends are in close connection with each other, and they both must embody 
virtues which are dispositions to act in such a way that moral goods and excellence can be achieved 
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in various practices, which constitute successful co-operation and human flourishing. MacIntyre, 
following Aristotle, stresses the social context of practices for their successful performance as a 
virtuous activity, hence virtues and virtuous practices must be the norm and taught in the city-state, 
or polis, for the effective realisation of individual members of the community to be and act virtuously. 
(Horton & Mendus 1994, 10-11; MacIntyre 1981, chap. 14.) 
 
Thirdly, tradition as a precondition for rational discourse and argumentation about moral concepts is 
one of recurring themes in MacIntyre’s work since After Virtue. By tradition and the resources which 
it gives through the background in which one is socialised, rational moral deliberation and action is 
altogether possible. MacIntyre claims that tradition as he understands it is not in any way inherently 
conservative or static. Tradition is the background upon which dynamic discussion about the concept 
of good must be built. To counter the argument that from this moral relativism is bound to come 
accepted, since each tradition is solely understood by standpoint of their own tradition, MacIntyre has 
argued that traditions do in time of crisis, and every tradition faces adversity, find resources in other 
traditions to help development in their own tradition or perish altogether, because of other tradition’s 
superior resources to their own moral tradition. (Horton & Mendus 1994, 11-12.) 
 
3. Franks’ Anarchistic Virtue Ethics 
 
Benjamin Franks presents an interesting, and somewhat surprising, reading and interpretation of 
MacIntyre’s virtue ethics. Based on his extensive research of anarchism’s theory and practice, both 
historically and contemporarily, Franks claims already in his work Rebel Alliances (2006) that 
anarchism, or at least social or class-struggle anarchism, is compatible with virtue ethics. However, 
only in is his subsequent articles, he has pursued explicitly the connection between anarchism and 
reformulated virtue ethical theory of Alasdair MacIntyre. Franks takes his cues to anarchistic virtue 
ethics from MacIntyre’s early virtue ethical works, mainly After Virtue (1981/2014), which stresses 
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the practices as the core feature of virtue ethics, whereas later virtue ethical works of MacIntyre has 
shifted towards more traditional understanding of virtue ethics as placing crucial importance to human 
nature and essentialism, which is problematic for Franks, who is vehemently anti-essentialist. This 
causes a tension which can potentially make Franks’ effort to combine his brand of anarchism and 
MacIntyre’s virtue ethical theory suspicious, if not downright impossible. 
 
In his article Anarchism and the Virtues (2010) Franks claims that what he calls practical, or 
prefigurative, anarchism is a form of anarchism which is most consistent with both the historical 
theory and practice of anarchists, as well as contemporary measures of anarchist activists. According 
to Franks, two main principles of practical anarchism which distinguishes it from other strands of 
anarchism are prefiguration and context-dependence of actions. Franks views these to be found also 
in Alasdair MacIntyre’s version of virtue ethics making the two theories analogous with each other. 
(Franks 2010, 135-136.) 
 
Prefigurative principle can be summarised by definition that means must embody the desired ends. 
Classic example of the anarchists’ commitment to prefigurative principle is the dispute between 
anarchists and Marxists during the First International (1864-1876, anarchists were effectively 
expelled in the Hague Congress of 1872) where anarchists argued that states should be abolished at 
the same time as capitalism and not use the state as means to stateless society. Since practical 
anarchism emphasises consistency between means and ends, it does come closer to virtue ethics than 
deontological or utilitarian conception of ethics which have traditionally been associated with 
anarchism in the academic discourses. Unlike deontology and utilitarianism, which evaluate the 
rightness of actions in accordance to universal moral law (deontology) or goodness of the 
consequences of actions (utilitarianism), practical anarchism shares with virtue ethics the internal 
evaluation of actions since the point of reference about rightness of actions do not assume external 
authority, such as moral law or overall happiness, from the actions themselves. Practical anarchism 
9 
is, according to Franks, here close to MacIntyrean (e.g. MacIntyre 1981/2014, 222-223) version of 
virtue ethics which underlines need of social practices, or actions, to be in harmony with means and 
ends, and also that for this link to be sustained it is important to realise the inherently social nature of 
practices and virtues. (Franks 2010, 142-146.) 
 
Another distinct feature of practical anarchism, which is closely linked to the prefiguration, is the 
context-dependence of actions. By this it is meant that struggles against hierarchies take different 
measures in different times and places. This also embodies the common anarchist, historical and 
contemporary, belief that there is no single, universal source of hierarchies; in contrast for example 
Leninists’ regard for capitalism as the source of all oppression, and by abolishing capitalism all other 
forms of hierarchies would be abolished by the downfall of capitalism. In practical anarchism these 
different forms of struggles are nevertheless linked to each other by the virtuous practises exercised 
in the struggles, and for example indiscriminate violence is prohibited by the prefigurative principle. 
Agency of individuals engaged in these struggles also must diverge from the positions which privilege 
party or other form of vanguard of change. Therefore, individuals take themselves in cooperation 
with others the responsibility for the struggles they engage. Here Franks finds common ground with 
MacIntyre in that for both of them virtuous practises are different depending on their context, but that 
those practises nevertheless embody the desired ends. MacIntyre’s insistence on tradition as an only 
possible way of understanding the world and its ethical debates is usually considered to be 
conservative in its approach, but according to Franks this does not need to have conservative 
conclusions since what this does affirm is the historical nature of humans and their context-
dependence. This does not mean, as it does not for MacIntyre himself, that traditions would be fixed 
and unchangeable, instead they evolve through internal debate and conflict with other traditions. Also, 
traditions themselves might have anti-hierarchical elements. (Franks 2010, 146-150.) 
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There are two characteristics in MacIntyre’s version of virtue ethics which present a problem for 
Franks’ project to place practical anarchism as a virtue ethic akin to MacIntyre’s. Franks’ identify 
these as the legalistic and the teleological challenge. 
 
By legalistic challenge Franks means virtue ethical presupposition of centralised and institutionalised 
state apparatus to enforce the basic law which guarantee that virtuous practises can be exercised 
within state. This is explicit in Aristotelian conception of the city-state, but also prevalent in 
MacIntyre’s version of virtue ethics by his arguing for commitment to obey certain fundamental rules 
which are enforced by the state so that virtuous activity can take place in society. Franks, on the 
contrary, contends that commitment to common and shared rules does not entail state apparatus as 
then one is guilty of a common error in mistaking state for society2. Franks makes the point that 
actually it is even more consistent with MacIntyre that virtues can flourish better in society without 
centralised and institutionalised state since MacIntyre criticises liberal individualism which was 
brought by Enlightenment in the 18th century, because instrumentalist bureaucracy began to ascend 
and to take hold on individuals’ lives through ever-expanding state in the guise of seemingly neutral 
arbiter between different conceptions of good life. (Franks 2010, 151-153.) It could be argued then 
that the legalistic challenge can be overcome rather easily once one understands that group of people, 
such as society, can create rules everyone ought to obey without the existence of state apparatus. It is 
the second challenge, the teleological challenge, identified by Franks which prove to be more 
problematic for the relationship between practical anarchism and virtue ethics. 
 
For Franks the teleological challenge is basically about essentialism which he identifies, and rightly 
so, to be central characteristic of virtue ethics. This is evident in Aristotle since he views nature 
hierarchically, for example slaves are slaves by their very essence so slavery is accepted as natural 
                                                 
2  Similarly, William Godwin (1756-1836), often claimed as a precursor to anarchism, responded to prominent 
conservative thinker Edmund Burke (1729-1797), when the latter lamented the French Revolution of 1789 and wished to 
restore sovereignty of the monarch in the state. Coincidentally, this is also noticed by MacIntyre in his A Short History of 
Ethics (1966/1998, 229-230). 
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phenomenon as well as women’s subordinated position in relation to men. This hierarchical 
understanding of the world is also reflected in the idea of justice according to desert which is 
configured by moral actors’ metaphysical biology. (Franks 2010, 154.) This has troubled Aristotelian 
philosophers in modern times, including MacIntyre (see e.g. 2014, 189), since Aristotle’s ethics are 
embedded in his overall system of metaphysical biology. For anarchism, and particularly for practical 
anarchism, essentialism in its original Aristotelian form is clearly problematic since it does 
presuppose explicitly social hierarchies. Also, more modest essentialist views such as benign 
essentialism which regards humans to be naturally good; which is often, usually questionably, 
attributed to certain anarchists, for example to Pjotr Kropotkin; are troublesome since they limit 
humane possibilities to action and tend to privilege those individuals who are aware of humans’ 
perceived real nature, thus, creating epistemological hierarchies. (Franks 2010, 154-155.) 
 
Franks claims to have resolved this contradiction between virtue ethics and practical anarchism 
through MacIntyrean methods since MacIntyre in his account of virtue ethics does distinguish 
multiple forms of goals of life, telos, in different branches of virtue ethics, it makes sense for Franks 
see the multiplicity of goals of life as destroying the assumption of single, predetermined and fixed 
telos in life. These goals vary depending on the historical conditions and intersect with each other 
without unifying under one overarching privileged position. (Franks 2010, 155-156.) Franks’ solution 
does bring certain reconciliation between practical anarchism and virtue ethics, but I would argue that 
its explicit rejection of essentialism of any kind does take away or at least significantly reduce the 
active agency of the subjects, which it tries so very hard to affirm in order to retain the autonomy of 




4. Further Arguments for Combining Anarchism with MacIntyrean Virtue Ethics 
 
MacIntyre in Dependent Rational Animals (1990, e.g. 130) and, also in his earlier writings which 
gives reasons to see his account of virtue ethics having certain affinity with materialism and radical 
socialism is his constant, even if infrequent, references to Marx. According to Niko Noponen (2011), 
Marx’s influence plays a crucial role also in MacIntyre’s explicitly virtue ethical works beginning 
with the publication of After Virtue (1981). I believe MacIntyre’s Marxist roots and concerns which 
are evident also in his later virtue ethical works, even if playing a supporting role to Aristotelian and 
Thomist perspectives, should be taken into an account better than it has been when assessing 
MacIntyre and his theory. Example of this kind of negligence is to be found in grouping MacIntyre 
together with communitarians against liberals as it generally was the case in the 1990’s, for example 
by Michael Walzer (Noponen 2011, 34). As Kelvin Knight (1998b, 290) claims the roots of placing 
MacIntyre as a communitarian have more to do with coincidental timing than shared philosophical 
project, since communitarians, according to Knight, opt ‘to strengthen rather than reject the 
institutions imposing order under capitalism’ (Ibid., 291; see also MacIntyre 1997/1998a, esp. 243-
246). There are commentators of MacIntyre who have seen the continuity of MacIntyre’s intellectual 
development from Marx to Aristotle and Aquinas, and how these thinkers are linked to each other, 
both in general and in MacIntyre’s body of work (Noponen 2011, 33-34; see also Stocker (1976) 
placing Aristotle and Marx on the same side against “schizophrenic” moral theories of Kantianism 
and utilitarianism). 
 
To use Marx as a gateway to bridge anarchism and virtue ethics might raise questions, if anarchism 
and Marxism are thought as intractable rivals with each other as the case has been occasionally both 
within and outside traditions discussed. However, to take such a hostile view of relations between 
anarchism and Marxism undermine the long theoretical and practical mutual co-operation and affinity 
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shared by them with each other. As anarchist theorists, for example Franks (e.g. 2012) and Ruth Kinna 
(2011), have shown both in the formulative years of working-class movement and today’s struggles, 
such as Occupy movement, these movements have been developing together resistance to oppressive 
institutions and practices. On the Marxist side certain strands of Marxist thinking, such as autonomist 
Marxism, were close to anarchism and aside from practical co-operation, certain eminent Marxist 
intellectuals of the late 20th century and early 21st century, such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, 
have recognised anarchism more fully as part of socialist canon, for example inclusion of anarcho-
syndicalist Georges Sorel in Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985/2014). To 
emphasise the close proximity between anarchism and Marxism historically, theoretically and 
practically is not meant to obscure the differences between them, since there are differences amplified 
by historical events, especially Bolshevik state socialist takeover of Russian Revolutions of 1917 and 
subsequent similar state socialist revolutions of other countries such as China and Cuba (Franks 2012), 
yet they have much more common than what divides them, and ultimately their goal is same, that of 
classless, moneyless and stateless world. As the non-aligned revolutionary socialist activist Guy 
Aldred (1886-1963) put it: ‘Marx DEFINED the social revolution, whilst Bakunin EXPRESSED it’ 
(quoted in Kinna 2011, 109)3. 
 
In addition to his affinity to Marx, there are other strands in MacIntyre’s body of work that facilitate 
the connection to be made between MacIntyre’s thinking with anarchism. As a corollary to one of his 
most consistent features of thought, critique of liberalism, has been his critical approach to the modern 
nation-state. For example, in Dependant Rational Animals (1999), he sees an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
virtue ethical community impossible to flourish in the context of modern nation-state, or at least only 
providing certain preliminary resources to create and maintain flourishing community of virtuously 
acting individuals. Although MacIntyre cannot vision societies without some kind of state apparatus, 
                                                 
3 Although this kind of conception of dual roles of Marx and Bakunin, and therefore Marxism and anarchism, was usual 
amongst the working-class people at that time, this does not do fully justice either to Marxists passion for the cause and 
conversely to anarchists’ intellectual contributions. It does, nevertheless, succinctly capture the deep connection between 
them as the main forces of the working-class movement. (Kinna 2011; Franks 2012.) 
14 
albeit very different from the one which is the norm of the day, his harsh criticism of nation-states 
does indicate that anarchistic rejection of state apparatus, which does not mean rejection of 
communities, is not that far from MacIntyre’s thinking on the issue. Sign of this can be founded on 
John Haldane’s description of MacIntyre as a kind of an ‘Augustinian anarchist’ (1995, 737). 
 
Another important example of MacIntyre’s lack of confidence in the modern liberal capitalistic 
nation-states is found in his reply to essays presented in the book dedicated to critical scrutiny of his 
oeuvre, After MacIntyre (1994). In the concluding chapter MacIntyre answers briefly to all essays 
presented in the book and while answering to Andrew Mason and Stephen Mulhall who defended 
liberalism in their respective essays, he claims that traditions might have to include some 
inconsistencies between beliefs and attitudes, because prevailing established traditions backed by 
authoritative institutions may be suspicious of alternative traditions (1994, 291). Also, in other 
writings MacIntyre (e.g. 1997/1998a) shows disdain for modern liberal nation-states and the need of 
small virtuous practice-oriented communities, usual examples employed by MacIntyre are Benedict 
monasteries (e.g. 1981/2014, 295) and fishing communities or historically English hand-loom 
weavers in the turn of the 19th century, MacIntyre cites the classic account of  historian E.P Thompson 
(e.g. ibid. 1994/1998, 231-234), to survive until liberal order reaches its seemingly inevitable end. It 
is interesting to see similarities with such remarks of MacIntyre and anarchistic practices, which have 
been called in both positive and negative light, part of lifestyle-anarchism, such as squatting and self-
sustaining and -governing communities, which one could characterise as anarchistic equivalents to 
monasteries, where virtuous practices can be exercised outside of liberal moral and political order. Of 
course, there are questions how plausible option it is to isolate communities from the wider world and 
is it particularly conducive, or in fact counter-productive, in the effort of promotion and 
implementation of anarchistic ideals in the world as a whole. Nevertheless, what MacIntyre has said 
regarding the need to be protective of one’s virtuous communities and practices is analogous and 
consistent with what Franks (2010, 146-48) claims pertaining to practical anarchistic communities 
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and their flexibility and autonomy to employ various forms of tactics, and the level of openness of 
activity, depending on the context of the circumstances they find themselves in. 
 
5. (Post-)Anarchisms and (Meta-)Ethics 
 
Franks claims in several different writings, for example in Rebel Alliances (2006) and Postanarchism 
and Meta-Ethics (2008), how virtue ethics in general is more compatible, and espoused usually 
implicitly in most versions of social, or class struggle, anarchism making differentiation not just 
between anarchisms which disagree on (meta-)ethical conceptions but also between social, or class 
struggle, anarchisms and individualist liberal, or lifestyle anarchisms. Closer look on these differences 
on (meta-)ethical issues within anarchism identified and problematised by Franks and others gives 
one a deeper understanding on why Franks sees essentialism as an unavoidable harming feature for 
anarchism, yet not making him fully embrace post-anarchism either. 
 
While framing the discussion on anarchism and moral philosophy Franks (2008, 135-137) has 
characterised and rightly criticised academic, especially analytical, philosophy’s understanding of 
anarchism as simply the avoidance of coercion based on deontological, quasi-Kantian grounds 
exemplified by Robert Paul Wolff4 and Robert Nozick, which Franks labels as right-libertarians. 
 
Franks (2008) offers his MacIntyrean influenced virtue ethics as a kind of third way between moral 
universalism of the classical anarchism and moral subjectivism of the post-anarchism. Franks tries to 
take best of the meta-ethical branches, universalism and subjectivism, combining them under the 
banner of virtue ethics. He makes the claim to be supportive of his project but does not focus enough 
                                                 
4 To group Wolff together with Nozick as a right-libertarian, as Franks has a habit of doing, is not a fair assessment of 
Wolff, since although he is a Kantian and approaches the question of legitimacy of the state from a Kantian viewpoint 
and primary from the purely theoretical standpoint, claiming him to be a right-winger is hardly plausible. Evidence to 
counter such a claim is already found in his major anarchistic work from a Kantian perspective In Defence of Anarchism 
(1970). 
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on post-anarchism’s, as exemplified by the prominent post-anarchist Saul Newman, inherent 
ontological failings due to its moral subjectivism. As Swann (2010a, see below chap. 5.2.) has shown 
post-anarchism which takes its cues from Max Stirner, of which Newman is a model example, are 
also guilty of essentialism, albeit different kind of essentialism which they accuse classical anarchism 
of. This is a point which Franks does not recognise in Newman’s subjectivism. His major complaint 
of such a subjectivism is that it cannot offer convincing platform of standards of evaluation for 
anarchistic, anti-hierarchical ethics. Same also goes for moral universalism although from a different 
viewpoint. There shall be a detailed discussion on Franks’ agreement and divergence with Newman 
below on this thesis in relation to my proposed amendment on Franks’ theory (see chap. 7.2.). 
 
While Franks’ accepts largely the post-anarchistic criticism of classical anarchism about essentialism, 
even if he does point out in various places that classical anarchist writings are not so simplistically 
based on essentialist claims as post-anarchists tend to claim (e.g. 2007, 133-136), his another 
significant criticism of post-anarchism, alongside the (meta-)ethical claim of its relativism brought 
about by its moral subjectivism, is its lack, or altogether rejection, of attention to economic matters. 
Franks’ contributes this at least partially to schism developed between anarchism and Marxism, when 
with the latter economic side of things come to be solely associated, usually in very reductionist 
fashion, and to the general trend of post-modernism, which influenced greatly certain strands of 
anarchism, so-called life-style anarchisms, with its focus on individuals, instead of group identities 
such as class. (Ibid., 136-138.) 
 
5.1. Swann’s Critique of Feasibility of Franks’ Practical Anarchism 
 
Thomas Swann presents a valuable critique of Franks’ vehemently anti-essentialist anarchism in his 
article Can Franks’ Practical Anarchism Avoid Moral Relativism? (2010b). There he claims that 
Franks does not succeed in his attempt to answer adequately to the threat of moral relativism, which 
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Franks identifies as a threat and as something which he is able to overcome. However, Swann makes 
a persuasive argument against Franks’ alleged solution to counter relativism and makes an analogy to 
MacIntyre and his change of opinion in the matter of essentialism. Next, I will discuss in more detail 
Swann’s critique found in the aforementioned article and in another one of his essays, Are 
Postanarchists Right to Call Classical Anarchisms ‘Humananist’? (2010a) which deals more 
generally about the relationship between anarchism and essentialism. 
 
Swann’s (2010b, 213) conclusion is that Franks’s theory of practical anarchism does actually restrict 
moral agency instead of its assumed consequence of enhancing it. This is because, Swann claims, 
relativism to which Franks’ conception of anarchism is bound to fall if it does not subscribe to some 
kind of moral universalism, not unlike what MacIntyre has done in his virtue ethically committed 
writing subsequent of After Virtue. Reason why Swann sees Franks succumbing to relativism is in 
Franks’ insistence on safeguarding thought and action from essentialist presumptions, which he 
considers to be inherently restricting and creating hierarchies, and on the other hand he maintains that 
in order to avoid falling into relativism, which he rightly understands as potentially undermining 
element to his project of providing a sound virtue ethical theory for anarchism, there needs to be 
internally coherent and consistent guidelines according to which moral deliberation can be conducted. 
But as Swann points out such grassroots level guidelines are difficult to ground without forming and 
accepting some sort of higher principles guiding lower level activity. Failure to give sufficient 
attention to this evokes relativism. Swann illustrates his point of incapability of Franks’ account to 
give reasonable standard to evaluate between rivalling course of action within anarchist virtue ethical 
tradition with example involving anarchist group split over an issue whether they should as a group 
support anti-racist or animal rights group. Swann argues that using Franks’ theory there is no way to 
answer to this question rationally since there are no essential features of anarchism, according to 
Franks, and therefore no standard to evaluate between those arguments which course of action to take. 
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Consequence of this is the Franks’ practical anarchism’s unintended impracticalness caused by 
relativism. 
 
Swann offers two possible solutions to the risk of relativism diagnosed by him in Franks’ theory of 
practical anarchism. First, he suggests re-articulation of moral universalism to regard universalism as 
something whose content would be non-hierarchical and liberated moral agency. Therefore, 
universalism would not be seen as having a hierarchical and morally limiting content which Franks 
alongside post-anarchists see as an inherent part of any universalism. (Swann 2010b, 211). 
 
Second possible solution which Swann offers to save Franks’ theory from relativism could be 
characterised as Wittgensteinian, since community which would share same principles and values 
with commitment to abide to such explicitly declared norms would, using Wittgenstein’s term, create 
a ‘language game’. For the members of the community, which in this case would constitute of 
anarchists, those commonly created and held norms would constitute an objective moral realm i.e. 
moral universalism. (Swann 2010b, 212.) 
 
Swann’s attempts to salvage Franks’ theory from relativism are technically valid, but leave one still 
puzzling with the question why one should endorse anarchist virtue ethics. This is also identified by 
Swann (2010a, 240-241) in his remark that Franks offers an ethical account ‘how to behave as 
anarchists’, without giving justification for accepting anarchism. Particularly the second of Swann’s 
proposed solutions, the one which I referred as Wittgensteinian solution, serves to the end of offering 
ethical guidelines to those already within the sphere of anarchism endangering anarchism to become, 
and this is what it has become to certain extent5, isolationist and parochial approach without having 
                                                 
5 This so-called lifestyle anarchism has received considerable criticism, especially from Murray Bookchin and other so-
called class-struggle anarchists, for being purely self-interested and passive in the face of truly revolutionary activity. 
Some of that criticism is certainly valid, but it must be remembered that “lifestyle anarchists” do rather often live 
according to values which exemplify the world where such anarchistic values would be the norm. So at least from the 
anarchistic virtue ethics viewpoint lifestyle anarchism could be described as bundle of an anarchistic practices, if not in 
the classical sense of anarchistic revolutionary activity.  
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an interest to take part in wider struggles for emancipation from oppressive practices. The other option 
of Swann, that of tweaking, what is the scope and the meaning of universalism, offers a better 
alternative to solving the problem of relativism, and also answering to the fundamental question of 
why virtue ethical anarchism ought to be gain support as an ethic of betterment of our world. In the 
next chapter I present my own proposed amendment, which can be seen as an extension of Swann’s 
re-articulation of universalism, based on materialism.  
 
Elsewhere, Swann (2010a) has argued that anarchisms of all kinds have certain essentialist claims in 
them. For example, post-anarchists fierce opposition to classical anarchism’s perceived essentialism 
does conceal the fact that despite post-anarchists’ portrayal of Max Stirner (see e.g. Newman 2011, 
322) as a classical anarchist whose thinking does not succumb to essentialism, and presenting Stirner 
both as a precursor and a role model for contemporary post-anarchism, Stirner valued free will and 
self-consciousness very highly and as necessary property of human activity, in other words as 
constituent features of essential human nature. (2010a, 239). Furthermore, both Franks and Simon 
Choat have offered similar criticism towards post-anarchism’s overtly positive view of Stirner. While 
Franks critiques Stirner and his post-anarchistic admirers from an anarchistic-virtue ethical 
perspective targeting especially Stirner’s subjectivism, he reiterates also Marx and Engels’ classic 
critique of Stirner and other Young Hegelians being guilty of idealism. Choat (see below for 
elaboration of his view), a Marxist, likewise cites Marx and Engel in his criticism of post-anarchism. 
 
More radically for post-anarchists, and for some anarchists who have been greatly influenced by post-
anarchists, yet want to identify simply anarchists such as Franks, Swann’s argument implies that 
rejection of essentialism altogether means rejection of such concepts as rationality, self-consciousness, 
free will and teleology, which Swann (2010a, 228-229) assess, based on writings of Daniel Dennett, 
Harry Frankfurt and Kate Soper, that display of one or more those concepts, or conditions, is sufficient 
for personhood, as being essentialist or humanistic, which is the sub-category of essentialism mainly 
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used in Swann’s article. This is problematic not only for anarchism but for critical thinking overall, 
if these everyday concepts would be thrown away, not just to criticise their content, but also as 
obsolescent, and even worse as restricting human’s activity. Swann does not find any of the proposed 
anarchistic line of thought, whether classical or post, avoiding essentialism, including Stirner and his 
post-anarchistic disciples, indeed Stiner seems to embrace idealist notions such as seemingly 
uncontained self-creation and self-consciousness perhaps more fully than any other classical anarchist. 
Swann does signal out Bakunin as a possible candidate for an anarchist thinker who avoids the post-
anarchist’s dreaded label of essentialist, but it comes as seeing Bakunin as a Hegelian who 
understands ‘Properties that are displayed by moral actors are not properties of that entity but are 
manifested properties of the universal Spirit (in Hegel) or Nature (in Bakunin) that develops through 
the dialectical progression of history’ (ibid., 238), who differentiates himself from Hegel only in 
rejection of latter’s idealism with naturalism. Nevertheless, Bakunin’s anti-essentialism which, if he 
is interpreted in such strictly Hegelian fashion since it is not the only way to understand Bakunin’s 
theory, even if it is certainly a plausible one, comes to reject, according to Swann, conditions 
characterised as humanistic: rationality, self-consciousness, free will and teleology. One or more of 
these conditions, if not all, are certainly highly valued by both Bakunin and post-anarchists. It is 
important to stress here the fact that Swann (ibid., 240-241) does not reject post-anarchism or its 
insights into anarchist theory, but aims, and succeeds, to show inconsistencies and fallacies in their 
ontological thinking and relationship to classical anarchists. For myself Swann’s criticism leads a way 
to different kind of approach to the question of essentialism in anarchism, and more generally, not to 
view it as inherently restricting, but fundamentally enabling. 
 
5.2. Choat’s Marxist criticism of (Post-)Anarchism 
 
Simon Choat’s article Politics, power and the state: the Marxist response to postanarchism (2013) 
offers a critique of post-anarchism by claiming the same theoretical shortcomings are still present 
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within post-anarchism which we were already noted deficiencies in classical anarchism by Marxist 
critics. Therefore, the counter-arguments can be largely recycled. Furthermore, Choat castigates post-
anarchists for appropriation of post-structuralism and eminent thinkers from a loosely defined group 
of post-structuralists, e.g. Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, as anarchist thinkers, even if their 
political commitment was very much to the Marxist cause and their intellectual endeavour indebted, 
among many other influences, to Marx. 
 
Choat laments post-anarchists oblivion to the fact that post-anarchism’s critique towards classical 
anarchism was already presented by Marxism in the 19th century. Choat identifies four points of 
criticism towards classical anarchism presented by post-anarchism which all have been critiqued 
before by Marxists: ‘it focuses too much on state; it offers an inadequate theory of power; it relies too 
heavily on humanist ontology; and it misunderstands the nature of politics.’ (Choat 2013, 333). 
 
What is especially relevant to note here about Choat’s assessment of post-anarchism is his remark 
that post-anarchism’s one of constitutive element, according to Choat, is its rather biased view of 
Marxism as economically reductionist and inherently authoritarian theory, not unlikely the views 
presented by classical anarchists against Marxism in the 19th century. As Choat observes post-
anarchists understanding of Marxism is largely negative and reiterates the familiar criticism provided 
by classical anarchism and such oppositional and prejudiced stance has gone largely unnoticed. Choat 
does highlight Benjamin Franks as a sole thinker who has criticised post-anarchists presentation of 
Marx and Marxism as well as more general rejection of class in the context of post-anarchism (Choat 




6. Proposed Amendment for Franks’ Virtue Ethical Anarchism 
 
Here I will present proposed amendment to virtue ethical anarchism which builds upon theories of 
Franks and MacIntyre. In certain ways it is an attempt to synthesis their theories, although it can be 
argued that Franks already tried to synthesis anarchism and virtue ethics explicitly philosophically, 
as he claims based on historical evidence the two theories in question have already been combined 
practically. Yet I find Franks account unsatisfactory in one important issue, namely essentialism and 
it’s categorical denying of it. However, MacIntyre’s later embrace of Thomist essentialism is not, I 
argue, convincing solution to the inadequacy which I identify in Franks. Through engaging with 
Franks’ anti-essentialism and MacIntyre’s Thomist essentialism I develop in this chapter an 
alternative approach which I name simply as materialism. Materialism which I here present and 
defend is designed on one hand, as an essentialism to overcome Franks’ foundational void and on 
other hand, to espouse essentialism which does not need to rely on such indefensible ontological and 
theological assumptions as MacIntyre’s Thomism. 
 
6.1. Argument for Materialism 
 
What is seen as problematic for both MacIntyre and Franks is essentialism, albeit for different reasons. 
For MacIntyre of After Virtue virtue ethics’ emphasis of essentialism which is deemed necessary to 
inform person’s pursuit of happiness, eudaimonia, as the goal, telos, of life, is secondary to the 
practice of activities, in which virtuous action is displayed and produce in themselves the moral, and 
also non-moral, goods. MacIntyre’s later conversion to Thomism is partly because of his 
unsatisfactorily account of Aristotelianism without adequately clear and strong view of essentialism. 
Accordingly, to his changed allegiance from Aristotle to Aquinas, eudaimonia has been superseded 
by supreme good provided by God in theistic universe, which is, according MacIntyre, only one to 
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make intelligent the goal-oriented activity (1992, 152). To summarise this kind Thomistic thinking 
which MacIntyre has come to endorse, teleology entails theology. Therefore Thomism, according to 
later MacIntyre, does provide a suitable essentialism, which he has by then come to see as a 
undisputable feature of virtue ethics. (MacIntyre 2007/2014, ix-xvii.) 
 
Franks, on the other hand, rejects any notion of essentialism because of supposed hierarchism, which 
he sees as being an inherent feature of essentialism. Essentialism as a hierarchy is therefore to be 
rejected, because it is incompatible with anarchism’s non-hierarchical position. Franks’ understanding 
of anarchism as a virtue ethic is well-argued, but it faces problems when giving grounds for accepting 
and acting according to anarchistic virtue ethic. As essentialism in virtue ethics, and elsewhere, has 
much to do with giving reason(s) to act in a certain way, rejecting it outright as incompatible and 
harmful to just and equalitarian social order, which anarchism aims to be, makes the justification and 
appeal of the anarchistic cause a difficult task. 
 
Next, I will make a twofold argument: one for essentialism and the other for materialism. Although I 
am more interested to argue for materialism than essentialism it is impossible, I claim, to be a 
materialist without also accepting essentialism since essentialism is a higher concept under which 
materialism is subsumed by essentialism as a certain form of it. Therefore, to make claims for 
materialism is also simultaneously to endorse essentialism. Essentialism is understandably concept 
which many have rejected, especially in post-modern times which we supposedly now live. Various 
strands of such thinking have influenced socialist thinking of all spheres. Testament to this are post-
Marxism and post-anarchism which are theoretical positions which have infused together with 
Marxism and anarchism post-structuralist theory of such thinkers as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze 
and Jean-Francois Lyotard alongside many other influences. In post-Marxism one prominent cause 
for the need to reformulate Marxism explicitly as a non-essentialist theory has been the failure of the 
proletariat’s rise to become a truly revolutionary force, leading to examine critically the notion of 
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revolutionary vanguard (see e.g. Laclau & Mouffe 1985/2001). Post-anarchism main feature has been 
its critique of classical anarchism’s perceived humanist view of human beings as naturally benevolent 
or in other terms as fundamentally good. For both, one of the main points of criticism of classical or 
orthodox versions of their parent theories has been their excessive or reductionist view of various 
struggles to economic matters, also in anarchism to anti-statism. 
 
Argument in favour of essentialism in general and for materialism as the form of essentialism to be 
accepted and forming the basis of human (and non-human) existence and activity is based on actual 
proceedings of life, of what is. This is a crucial and always implicitly recognised state of affairs in 
life generally considered. I only want to bring this fact of life explicitly to the centre of the argument 
of human existence and actions in the spheres of social and ethical philosophy. Negligence of 
materiality of beings and the world which we inhabit has, and has had, extremely ill effects upon the 
practical matters and theory as well. Putting the common sensical notion of materialism as the first 
principle of life and its all activities, I am following the footsteps of the most distinguished thinkers 
and activists of the 19th century’s radical socialists. This is precisely what, amongst others, Marx & 
Engels argued for in German Ideology (1845-46/1978) and Bakunin in God and the State (1882/2016). 
 
My justification of materialism as the essentialist first principle of life is rather common sense -type 
of argument, but it is also something which we cannot nor wish to disagree with based on the everyday 
experiences we have in satisfying our material basic needs and other non-immediate needs which 
would not be possible without satisfying basic needs first. To put it crudely, there would not be any 
activity, philosophising or anything else, if we did not eat, drink, sleep etc. Essentialism as understood 
in the form I am espousing it here differs markedly from essentialism which is usually associated with 
virtue ethics, and also to other theories where essentialism is regarded as a significant component 
such as second-wave feminism, in that it does not seek to claim anything further, for example certain 
assumed gender-specific qualities, than this fact of materiality of our existence. What I mean by this 
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is that there is no fixed telos for humans. This is contrary to the traditional forms of virtue ethics, 
whether found in ancient Greece or in medieval Catholicism, in which there was an idea of a fixed 
aim, telos, of life which on the one hand guides one towards certain existence and behaviour, and on 
the other hand placed restrictions to hinder one’s quest to reach that preordained aim. Whereas the 
traditional kind of understanding of essentialism as having a particular aim, telos, for one’s life have 
normative precepts and rather arbitrary restrictions, such as for women and slaves in ancient Greece 
simply because of their supposed essence, essentialism which I espouse and articulate here is perhaps 
best to understood as metaethical, perhaps even ontological, rather than normatively ethical concept. 
This means that our and more generally our living environment’s, of which we are part of, material 
constitution forms a background to all that there exists, and this must be acknowledged and given a 
due place in ethical and political thinking and action. This kind of universalist essentialism does not 
preclude alternative conceptions of the good, contrary to the views of, for example, post-anarchists 
(see, for example, Swann 2010b, 200), since materialism, i.e. acknowledging and giving a due place 
for our materially constituted existence in matters involving our and our environment’s wellbeing and 
flourishing, enables any kind of conception of the good to come into being at all.  
 
Given that I conceive materialism to be kind of a necessary but not a sufficient condition6 and thus 
giving to my theory both a solid materialist foundation and following from that foundation variety of 
forms are enabled to manifest themselves in the social sphere. I  am inclined to view my conception 
of materialism to have certain affinity with other socialist thinkers’ ideas, such as Laclau & Mouffe’s 
notion of socialist dimension (1985/2014, 162, 176) and Jacques Rancière’s equality (2003/2006, 52) 
as all of them serves as a presupposition and a field in which struggles for emancipation come 
intelligible and meaningful. It must be stressed, though, that I have developed materialism more as 
                                                 
6 Franks (2010, 139-140) has argued rather convincingly that these formulations archetypical for analytical philosophy 
do not make justice for complex and ever-evolving philosophical theories such as anarchism, offering a more nuanced 
approach to localise political philosophies core and peripheral features which are subject to temporal and spatial changes 
based on the work of Michael Freeden. My usage of necessary and sufficient conditions ought to be understood here more 
as a shorthand and tentative than rigid and ahistorical ideological constructions of analytical philosophy.  
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an ontological principle than Laclau & Mouffe and Rancière have with their respective concepts, but 
what draws me to make connection to them instead of explicitly ontological claims like that of 
Heideggerian Dasein, is their inherent political orientation directed towards various spheres of social 
reality. Furthermore, linking politics and ontology more closely together is, I believe, consistent with 
MacIntyre’s overall approach of making philosophy relevant again in people’s lives and communities 
in the spirit of Ancient Greece’s city-states. 
 
Moreover, materialism also gives a standard against to which evaluate practices whether of 
individuals or communities. As has been shown above in this paper, this has been one of the most 
difficult parts of both MacIntyre and Franks’ theories to establish clearly without succumbing to 
relativism. For an argument that materialism can provide such an account, it needs to be emphasised 
that from this does not follow determinism7, since this standard is not exhaustive. It only gives 
preliminary tools of evaluation by pointing out the necessary features, i.e. material, but each practice 
must be evaluated in the context of their own circumstances. Understanding and accepting that such 
an account of evaluation is and cannot be anything else but preliminary is not, however, be taken as 
a sign of weakness for the theory. Quite the opposite is true, since this kind of approach avoids the 
difficult questions of moral absolutism in regards of knowing and justifying absolutist principles in 
the complex and ever-evolving world, and on the other hand offers an alternative for relativism by 
grounding moral philosophical deliberation and evaluation on undisputable facts, which are at the 
same time lived and shared experiences throughout our environment, without the assumption of fixed 
and narrow answers. Making the claim that facts play a pivotal role in moral philosophy does in itself 
fall one to the prey of classical mistake of assuming ought from is. As MacIntyre (1959/1971; see 
                                                 
7 Materialism is not as such either necessarily in contradiction with deterministically ordered models of universe even if 
it is in contradiction with deterministically theistic theories, like various forms of Christianity, since materialism is 
structurally devoid of theism. This does not mean that materialism and theism could not co-exist at least theoretically 
since such possibility has been presented in the form of Hobbesian mechanical materialism for example, but it is hard to 
imagine theism work in such a union more than superfluous superstructure without any true effect, or vice versa things in 
material realm only being shallow remains of perfected idealistic forms akin to Platonism. Question of materialism and 
deterministic explanation excluding (conventional) theism is another question and beyond the scope or relevance for this 
work. 
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also 1988, chap. XV-XVI) has shown David Hume, to whom this view is subscribed to and 
subsequently cited as an opponent of such naturalistic fallacies, never claimed this much and indeed 
based very much of his own moral and political outlook on the actual English way of things and 
stressed greatly the value and importance of customs as a stabilising force in the society. Lesson to 
be the learned from Hume and his later impact is that is does play a role in the forming of ought and 
making a strong case for belittling the influence of is on the ought serves only to blur the interplay 
between practice and theory, between is and ought. Therefore, the question is not whether ought from 
is, but what kind of is should inform ought. 
 
MacIntyre addressed the issue of essentialism and matters closely relating to it, such as first 
principle(s) and ought-is-dichotomy discussed above in relation to Hume, eventually by turning to 
Thomistic metaphysics affiliating therefore theology with moral progress claiming that they go hand 
in hand. In his later works it is ubiquitous assumption, but it is also explicitly stated as in an article 
Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy (1992), where he writes that ‘The moral progress of the plain 
person is always the beginnings of pilgrim’s progress’ (ibid., 152). While one could see such 
statements more of an allegorical in their nature than actually arguing for inherent and necessary 
connection between theology and morality, MacIntyre (1990, 124-125) has stressed elsewhere that 
the strength of which makes Thomism the best tradition to respond issues concerning moral inquiry, 
is its dialectical birth by Thomas of Aquinas synthesising two rival philosophical traditions, 
Aristotelianism and Augustinism, competing for the hegemony inside Medieval Roman Catholic 
Church. MacIntyre contends that Thomism’s inherently dialectical nature makes it best suited for 
further moral progress because it itself was conceived by dialectical play of forces creating superior 
synthesis in relation to its starting premises. Despite all of Thomism’s openness to accept new ideas, 
MacIntyre is not willing, neither as Aquinas was, to question sacred principles of their system of 
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thought, namely God and the Scriptures.8 Religion aside, this comes as problem for philosophy when 
such disputable belief is taken for granted as a guarantee of moral enquiry, as in the case of Aquinas 
and MacIntyre. This makes one more convinced to accept MacIntyre’s above quotation more as a 
normative than mere allegorical statement. Although historically widespread assumption, and 
certainly in Aquinas’ time, that there cannot be morality without God or religion, and in the modern 
times such notion is often associated with Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, modern anthropology 
and other similar sciences have discredited such of a notion, or at least logical connection between 
them where one, morality, could not exist without the other, God or religion. In modern era’s 
philosophy subscribing to such a view explicitly and strongly, as MacIntyre seems to do, at least in 
certain foundational level, makes his Thomistic theory difficult to accept, at least wholly. On the other 
hand, going against his own time has been somewhat typical for MacIntyre, and for him embracing 
Thomism seems to fit to the that mould. 
 
It is noteworthy that in A Short History of Ethics (1966/1998) MacIntyre, who at that time was not an 
Aristotelian or Thomist, presents criticism of Aristotle and Aquinas which I find compelling to accept 
in large parts still, even if MacIntyre has had a change of mind since, especially regarding Aquinas. 
MacIntyre’s treatment of Aristotle is rather sympathetic, yet he offers a far stronger criticism towards 
Aristotle’s hierarchical and discriminating account of well-ordered virtue ethical society than in his 
later avowedly virtue ethical writings. Partly reason for this is down to the fact that A Short History 
of Ethics is rather ambitious book encompassing the historical development of western moral 
philosophy without argument for any specific tradition of moral philosophy, apart from emphasising 
that ethical thinking does not happen in a vacuum but is historical in its nature (Ibid., chap. 1). Mainly, 
however, it is about MacIntyre’s subsequent conviction and commitment to virtue ethic that has seen 
him, since After Virtue (1981/2014), engaged in positive theory building of his own, which was 
                                                 
8 Janet Coleman (1994, 81-82) has questioned MacIntyre’s presentation of Aristotle and Aquinas as particularly dynamic 
thinkers, instead offered a view of them, perhaps more aligned to the conventional standpoint, that their philosophy is 
ahistorical and rely on universal, timeless essences against which practices are measured to. Depicting their theories 
instead as historically bound MacIntyre is not, according to Coleman, actually a Thomist. 
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largely absent in his earlier career, forcing him to develop virtue ethical theory further to address 
Aristotle’s, and in general Ancient Greece’s virtue ethical thought’s, elitist foundations which 
effectively make philosophy and happiness only truly accessible to ‘a small leisured minority” 
(MacIntyre 1966/1998, 83). For MacIntyre, one of the ways to keep Aristotle’s virtue ethic’s most 
valid parts relevant and rejuvenate virtue ethics is to emphasise practices, which has enabled for 
example Franks to mesh MacIntyrean virtue ethic with anarchism (see chap. 3 above), instead of rigid 
essentialism according to metaphysical biology. Another means for MacIntyre has been his radical 
reversal of opinion on Aquinas, as well as Christianity overall. Whereas in A Short History of Ethics 
MacIntyre (1966/1998, chap. 9) presents Aquinas and medieval Catholic thought overall as influential 
but philosophically susceptible as its it grounds itself on non-philosophical sources such as Scripture, 
leading MacIntyre to largely overlook (Catholic) Christianity significance in moral philosophy’s 
canon. Contrast between his earlier and later positions are clearly remarked by MacIntyre in his 
preface to second edition of A Short history of Ethics where he lambasts himself for treating Aquinas 
and other Catholic thinkers as insufficiently philosophical and finds in hindsight much to be desired 
in his analysis of Catholicism (1997/1998b, ix-xi), While his reversal on Aquinas is understandable 
in the light of his later writings and positions, I incline to argue that MacIntyre himself has provided 
a good argument in his earlier work to question his later stance on whether Aquinas, or more generally 
strongly religion bound theories, can provide foundations for a sustainable and feasible moral 
philosophy. This is not to deny theologies, especially Catholicism which has long tradition of rational 
theology aimed at providing a sound base and justification for belief, would be void of all moral 
content. However, by closer inspection it does come apparent that such theories rest unwarrantedly 
on a matter of preference and belief ultimately making them liable to moral subjectivism. This is 
something which is observed by young MacIntyre but which he later made attempts to overcome 
through his efforts to ‘modernise’ Aristotelian virtue ethical theory mainly by emphasising Aquinas’ 
role in its development while simultaneously belittling, but not hiding, Thomism’s strong belief based 
foundation while lauding its moral philosophical credentials. I find myself agreeing with young 
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MacIntyre on this matter while lamenting older MacIntyre’s conclusion to land on epistemologically 
shaky grounds of theology as an answer to an otherwise acute observation for the need of essentialism. 
 
Albeit I find MacIntyre’s Thomistic solution to the problem of essentialism unsatisfactory, he does 
make valid point of having coherent ontological grounding to moral philosophy. So, with some 
cautiousness, I could claim my materialism take such a position equivalent of what MacIntyre has in 
his theory for theologically ordered universe. Materialism does certainly differ in various parts from 
Thomistic ontology, most obviously being methodologically atheistic or irreligious. It also differs in 
its greater plausibility to ground one’s actions and beliefs, moral or other, than Thomism in that we 
have good enough reasons to believe certain kind of ontology to be true if it can give us satisfactory 
(secular) explanations to certain questions. MacIntyre takes these questions to be answered in 
Thomistic theological ontology to be best one has found so far (1990), but MacIntyre seems to be 
taking theory’s internal coherence as a sign of its truthfulness. Thomistic theory and MacIntyre’s own 
updated version of it might be internally coherent, but same can be said from many other theories as 
well, and even if it could be accepted that MacIntyre’s theory is more coherent than other competing 
theories which he has criticised for inconsistencies found in them, it does not follow from this that 
his Thomistic theory triumphs. Only condition under which such conclusion can be made with any 
degree of confidence is belief, and nothing suggests we ought to belief more in theological 
explanations, of any kind, than materialistic constitution of reality and explanations and framework 
which it gives us to act, morally and otherwise, in the world. Lifeworld, or certain Dasein, of 
theologically ordered universe of later MacIntyre’s Thomism has its teleology towards God and what 
such deity has in mind for humans when they have fully realised their potential and become virtuous 
according to a certain fixed ahistorical telos, that of Catholic Christianity in the context of Thomism. 
MacIntyre (e.g. 1990 & 1999) seems to maintain, nevertheless, that his earlier practice-oriented virtue 
ethics, based on which Franks develops his anarchistic virtue ethics, does hold its validity, since 
essentialism which he readily come to embrace later concerns more general level of ontology than 
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moral philosophical practical matters, which are only intelligent when more foundational ontological 
principles, in his theory, those of Thomism, are accepted, but does not directly determine outcomes 
of moral deliberation. 
 
One could argue that issue between materialism and Thomism, or more generally between open-
ended and closed ontologies, is case of preference, and only criteria one can truly have is the 
coherence of such theories. Coincidentally, that kind of submission to relativism is the most abhorrent 
conclusion for both MacIntyre and Franks, yet both seem to edge towards it. While Franks’ position 
is easier to show implicitly acceding to relativism (see Swann 2010b; also above chap. 5.1.), 
MacIntyre case is more complicated largely because of his decades long polishing of his theory which 
is far more ambitious in its scope to accommodate subjects ranging from ontology to ethics and 
politics to moral psychology, which is not surprising considering he sees himself as a successor to 
Aristotle and Aquinas. Comparing to Franks, who concentrates largely on moral and political 
philosophical aspects, MacIntyre’s more encompassing intellectual project and greater variation of 
allegiances throughout of that endeavour, makes it harder to precisely categorise MacIntyre and his 
positions. However, what is relevant to the case in hand, MacIntyre could be summarised as having 
an elaborate and internally coherent system supposedly safeguarding against relativism, but in order 
to this be convincing theologically ordered universe serves as a necessary backstop for it be efficient, 
and such is in the last instance matter of belief, leading to relativism akin to MacIntyre’s much derided 
existentialism (e.g. 1981/2014) as one’s philosophical outlook is ultimately a matter of choice (1988, 
chap. XX), even if he stresses the intellectual dialectical debate and coming to accept the strongest 
argument, one is, as he openly admits (1990), always a partial participant in those debates. It would 
seem strange that such commitment would not play role of slanting one’s view towards pre-
determined desired results, no matter how strongly one would strive to objectivity despite 
acknowledged preference. MacIntyre is certainly right in emphasising that we never can be objective 
in a way common fallacy stemming from natural sciences has made us believe. This does not mean 
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that one could not deliberate matters in a comprehensive and analytic manner but neglecting to 
recognise one’s deeply held views does not help reaching desired, yet ultimately utopian dream of 
objectivity. Quite the contrary applies and by acknowledging one’s biases one is closer to objectivity, 
as close as one can realistically expect to achieve. Same applies for MacIntyre, who does not seem to 
be able to reconcile his Thomism and the religious-philosophical implications it carries with his 
earlier, still very much endorsed, commitment to practices at the centre of virtue ethics. Claiming that, 
such practises need a wider framework to be intelligent and have meaning, provided by Thomistic 
universe, MacIntyre takes a leap, which assumes too much, without providing answer to why one 
must go to such conclusion in order to make practices and life, which is constituted by those practices, 
meaningful, especially when such conclusion rests on, in the last instance, belief.  
 
Noponen (2011, 34) raises the important issue about MacIntyre when he asks can MacIntyre’s theory, 
while one can argue it to be internally coherent, be empirical supported? The burden of proof about 
validity of MacIntyre’s theory to clinging on the empirical evidence’s support is also recognised by 
Knight (1998a, 10-11) and by MacIntyre (see e.g. 1981/2014, 27) himself when he stresses the 
importance of recognising the sociological theory accompanying every moral-political philosophy. 
Noponen’s interpretation of MacIntyre puts into the centre of his theory the phenomenon of alienation 
from practises emphasising Aristotelian-Marxist reading of MacIntyre neglecting his later Thomism 
and theoretical implications brought with it to his overall project. While Noponen’s reading of 
MacIntyre as an Aristotelian-Marxist thinker does support Franks’, and subsequently my, take on 
MacIntyre as a virtue ethical ally in proving explicit commitment to virtue ethics to be harnessed for 
the anarchist, or more broadly speaking libertarian socialist, cause, it does not problematise enough 
consequences brought to MacIntyre’s theory by its commitment to Thomism. 
 
Noponen (2011) does not mention what possible implications MacIntyre’s later turn to Thomism has 
for his theory. For example, his (ibid., 51-52) argument that evolutionary explanation model for 
33 
morality and moral realism’s emergence throughout the civilisations, which he (ibid., 60, ref. 15) 
claims not be in contradiction with MacIntyre. However, Noponen does not take into consideration 
how MacIntyre with his later committed Thomism would react with such of an interpretation. Also, 
as Noponen (2011, 44, 59 ref. 7) notes that MacIntyre’s Aristotelian ethics stresses the practices as 
the most primary feature of Aristotle’s theory overcoming the criticism presented for example by 
Charles R. Pidge that Aristotelianism’s functionalist conception of humanity would bind 
Aristotelianism to biological assumptions regarding human nature, which do not hold in the light of 
scientific, naturalist view of humanity. Even if Aristotelianism can be recovered by prioritising 
arguably the most relevant feature of Aristotle’s theory, those of practices, MacIntyre’s later Thomism 
and metaphysical-theological implications associated with it might reverse this, since MacIntyre 
(1992/1998, 152) has endorsed the view of the need to have theological framework to make practices 
intelligible. Such of view would indicate replacing erroneous Aristotelian metaphysical-biological 
essentialism with Thomist metaphysical-theological essentialism, which is equally susceptible to be 
rejected by modern scientific-naturalist outlook. 
 
Instead by focusing Aristotelian-Marxist side of MacIntyre and arguing (Noponen 2011, 50; 
MacIntyre 1994/1998) that MacIntyre’s project involves some kind of a task of completing Marx’s 
unfinished philosophical work underlined in Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Noponen’s interpretation 
assumes both that MacIntyre sees Marx as essentialist thinker, which most certainly is the case, and 
more controversially that young Marx’s theory has implicit essentialist view of human nature9. 
Concerning the question of what kind of essentialist Marx was, or would have been, I would, 
tentatively, argue essentialist of historical and materialist kind articulating for a view of essentialism 
which would overcome reification into ahistorical essence or forms akin to Platonic forms. This kind 
of view is supported by Marx and Engels’ theory of materialist conception of history, or historical 
                                                 
9 What is the relation between young and mature Marx in general and particularly relevant here concerning essentialism 
is another question which is not discussed here further (for that discussion see e.g. Moisio 2011), but what is, nevertheless, 
worth mentioning here is that MacIntyre supports the continuation theory between young and mature Marx in the dispute 
regarding the Marx’s intellectual development (MacIntyre 1994/1998, 224; also, Noponen 2011, 36)  
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materialism (see e.g. their 1845-1846/1998; also, Marx 1844/2007 and 1845/1998), and also by 
Bakunin (see e.g. 1882/2016), all three, and many other socialist materialists of the 19th century, 
where in one way or another disciples of Ludwig Feuerbach and recognised widely his work, 
especially The Essence of Christianity (1841/1989). 
 
Emphasising connection between ontology and ethics is commendable, but more modest ontology is 
better suited to serve such need. That would be materialist in its essence following the example set 
by Feuerbach and his followers in various strands of socialism. Therefore, offering a way to connect 
materialist essentialism with revolutionary socialist thought and particularly in this thesis with 
anarchism. 
 
6.2. Mutually Completing Characters of Virtue Ethics and Materialism 
 
MacIntyre’s later career book Dependant Rational Animals (1999) gives, I believe, an account which 
points to directions which make combining virtue ethics and materialism, and to lesser degree radical 
socialism, including anarchism, with them more plausible than it might first appear. In Dependant 
Rational Animals (1999) MacIntyre deals primarily with the question of vulnerability of animals10 , 
both human and non-human. This is shown by arguments and examples in which, first and foremost, 
their physical existence is threatened, therefore risking their development in other areas of life which 
are built upon the physical existence, namely the body, and its well-being. This is materialism as it is 
universally understood and accepted, even if usually not consciously recognised. So MacIntyre’s 
starting point here is (human) animals’ material well-being and from this he goes on to his more 
familiar argument about the importance of virtues and social context in which they are practised for 
the flourishing of both individuals and their immediate communities and finally of the species overall. 
                                                 
10 MacIntyre does spend considerably part of the book to emphasise that all animals have shared vulnerability and thus 
pointing to the fact that animals have more common with each other than it is generally recognised. Although that part of 
MacIntyre’s argument is interesting, it is out of the scope of this work to examine what implications it would have, for 
example how humans should treat non-human animals. 
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For my argument about the need to explicitly recognise the interlocked nature of virtue ethics and 
materialism, MacIntyre’s discussion of material vulnerability in relation to virtues and human 
flourishing is a sign of affinity between our projects and their theoretical closeness with each other. 
MacIntyre too, as am I, is regretful about the negligence of bodily experience in moral philosophy, 
exemplified by his brief reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his remark that we are our bodies 
(MacIntyre 1999, 6). Moreover, MacIntyre while using Aristotle’s ideas as the starting point of an 
account which he calls ‘virtues of acknowledged dependence’ (ibid., 8) since MacIntyre sees him as 
the philosopher who has taken into consideration human animality most seriously, offering the best 
road to think about vulnerability and dependence in relation to moral philosophy, he also criticises 
Aristotle as being one of the oldest originators of obscuring our bodily being and its relevance to 
philosophy. This is down to Aristotle’s ideal citizen, the magnanimous man (see Nicomachean Ethics, 
IV chap. 3), and the masculine virtues11 closely associated with it, which presents exaltation of self-
sufficiency and not allowing to show signs of weakness (MacIntyre 1999, 7). So, even if Aristotle 
might have acknowledged more fully than anyone else during his own time or a long time afterwards 
how human beings are material, bodily creatures, this clearly did not affected to his political and 
ethical thinking to include the need for dependence and co-operation, at least not on equal terms 
between people, with model of virtuousness being the magnanimous man, who must demand 
superiority on the basis of his supposed moral greatness.  
 
Closely linked to MacIntyre’s remarks on vulnerability are the references he makes to Marx in 
Dependant Rational Animals, which are worthwhile to mention also in the context of virtue ethics 
and materialism. While it is not uncommon for MacIntyre to cite Marx also in his later explicitly 
virtue ethical works, and usually in a rather sympathetic tone, making such positive reference to Marx, 
a materialist, in a work which addresses living beings shared vulnerability, especially bodily i.e. 
                                                 
11 One can see here a precedent of what one would call contemporarily as ‘toxic masculinity’. More generally it is 
interesting how virtues have been gendered into masculine and feminine virtues and what kind of effect such a division 
still has in virtue ethical discourse. 
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material vulnerability, is noteworthy for the purposes to emphasise connection between (MacIntyrean) 
virtue ethics and materialism. MacIntyre (1999, chap. 11) refers to Marx in the context of discussing 
political and social structures of communities where virtues of acknowledged dependence would 
flourish. MacIntyre begins his inquiry with a reference to Marx’s famous maxim of ‘From each 
according to her or his ability, to each, so far as is possible, according to her or his needs’ (quoted in 
MacIntyre 1999, 130), remarking that even if achieving maxim’s goal could not be possible, to take 
it as a guideline and apply it, even imperfectly, is needed in order to build a society where wellbeing 
and flourishment of all is the focus and vulnerability of its members is the norm, not a special 
exception to the rule of ever active and vibrant individuals. MacIntyre not only comes to reject 
capitalism as economic system of such a desired society which he theorises about (ibid., 145) but also 
modern nation-states (ibid., 131-133), which gives added weight not only to the connection with 
MacIntyre’s virtue ethics and materialism but also with anarchism. It is worth mentioning that this 
does not mean that MacIntyre is an anarchist or even a Marxist, since he has identified himself most 
clearly as an Aristotelian-Thomist (e.g. 1990; 1999), but given his positions on various economic and 
political questions as well as his past background as a Marxist, there is considerable common ground 
between virtue ethics which MacIntyre has developed and endorsed and various strands of materialist 
based socialisms. Another related question would be what really is MacIntyre political position 
considering his various seemingly contradicting views and affiliations. That is extremely interesting 
question, yet one which is not of great relevance to this thesis. Given all the shared affinity that can 
be discerned to exist between (MacIntyre’s) virtue ethics and materialism, nevertheless, MacIntyre 
does not describe his theory as materialistic, thereby treating material constitution of life merely as a 
shared, presupposed fact of life, but as such of a fact which cannot be excluded if moral and political 




7. Points of Criticism 
 
In this section I will address in more detail certain parts of my work which are in varying degrees in 
conflict with intentions of thinkers, mostly MacIntyre and Franks, of whom I have drawn material for 
my own theory to the conclusion diverging from their respective conclusions. Of course, it is 
commonplace that philosophers borrow premises from others who can hold widely differing views, 
but since I have wanted to show that one can link Franks and MacIntyre’s, or to put it more generally 
anarchism and virtue ethics, views together with the addition of materialism in one coherent theory, 
it is relevant to ask is this kind kinship between anarchism, virtue ethics and materialism possible and 
what kind of problems can raise, and have already risen, out of such combination of theories. Some 
of these already existing and possible issues I will identify and try to give answers and assurances 
that despite certain internal tensions that combination of virtue ethical anarchism with materialism as 
an essentialism is a plausible addition to the philosophical discourse. 
 
7.1. Suitability of Virtue Ethics for Anarchism 
 
Virtue ethics and anarchism cause understandably certain amount of doubt when paired together as 
Franks or I have done here following his footsteps. Initially they seem to be strange bedfellows from 
obvious reasons as one is ethical theory which has hierarchically structured class society strongly 
embedded to itself ever since the theories of Plato and Aristotle and another is a political theory which 
most radically calls for non-hierarchical relations in all spheres of life. But as Franks, and also 
MacIntyre particularly in his early works following his aretaic turn, mainly After Virtue (1981/2014), 
have argued what is also a crucial part of virtue ethics, and for them the most defining part of it, is its 
understanding of practices and how they constitute building of both flourishing persons and 
communities and how their flourishing is intimately connected to each other. Also, earlier mentioned 
history of anarchism and its relation to Marxism in the early days of working-class movement does 
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support the case of affinity between anarchism and virtue ethics. But it would be a great simplification 
to assert that virtue ethics would be exclusively compatible with anarchism within the broad banner 
of socialism, or that all anarchists have been and only can be virtue ethicists. Same goes for other 
socialists, as not e.g. all Marxists are consequentalists, let alone Leninist brand of consequentalists. 
For example, Sergei Nechayev’s (1847-1882), who has been often seen as emblematic figure of 
anarchism’s indifference to ethics and for anarchists supposed mindless appetite for destruction, ‘any 
means necessary’ consequentalism is closer to Leninism than main currents of the anarchism of his 
era which adhered to prefigurative principle, at least implicitly (Jun 2010, 58-59, Franks 2006, 98). 
Therefore, the most natural objection to combine virtue ethics and anarchism comes from within 
anarchism and more broadly from the larger sphere of socialist thinking. To give an adequate answer 
to the question of why virtue ethics over other ethical traditions to give revolutionary socialist 
philosophy and movements their needed moral foundations12, is beyond the scope of this thesis but it 
is important to remark that within anarchism there is a significant moral philosophical debate and 
variance regarding which ethical theory is best suited for anarchism (see e.g. Franks 2006). Here for 
the reasons of convenience and limited space, I assume based on, mainly, the work of Franks that 
virtue ethical position is not only possible but the most suitable for the anarchist cause. 
 
7.2. Compatibility of Materialism as an Essentialism with Anarchism 
 
Perhaps the most consistent feature of all post-anarchism is its anti-essentialism. Many post-
anarchists have argued that essentialism is inherently restricting and hierarchical notion of classical 
anarchism which is to be discarded from anarchism so that anarchism can be a viable political 
philosophy for our ages (see e.g. Newman 2011). I have already addressed this issue by using Swann’s 
                                                 
12 This has been also a under debate within socialism and some have outright rejected the need for moral philosophy in 
the revolutionary thinking and action considering such activity to be a part of bourgeois superstructure which is claimed 
to follow deterministically from economic base. Therefore, it is suggested, such deliberation is rather useless, and even 
counter-revolutionary. This kind of view has been prevalent particularly in orthodox, soviet style Marxism, but also certain 
strands of anarchism can be argued to have been guilty of such a crudely deterministic view. 
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close readings of inherent essentialisms founded also in the fervently outspoken anti-essentialists, 
especially Saul Newman. Even if such contradictions are found in many anti-essentialist post-
anarchists, that does not erase the importance of their argument underlying the demands for anti-
essentialism. What is more relevant for my case of materialistic essentialist anarchism, is Franks’ 
insistence on the one hand rejecting essentialism and on the other firmly claiming not be a post-
anarchist while appreciating the emergence of post-anarchism and its proponents questioning the 
foundations of anarchistic thought. Franks (2008) has argued against universalist moral philosophical 
versions of anarchism with the help from the criticism provided by post-anarchists. These include 
universalist naturalist position that does come in certain aspects, particularly in ontological claims, 
quite close to my formulation of materialism thus serving as a fine counter-argument for me to 
examine. Two other universalist modes of thinking identified by Franks are Kantian rationalism and 
intuitionism, of which the latter is largely dismissed because of its well-established difficulties and, 
also because it has not been influential in the anarchist moral philosophy. Kantian rationalism is the 
other universalist (meta-)ethical approach alongside naturalism which are taken to closer scrutiny by 
Franks. 
 
Next, I will construct a counterargument for my above formulated claim of the need for essentialism 
in the form materialism to ground Benjamin Franks’ practical anarchism with solid meta-ethical and 
ontological foundation by constructing such a counter-argument based on Franks’ writings where he 
has discussed meta-ethical claims of anarchism. I will mainly use Franks’ article Postanarchism and 
Meta-Ethics (2008) because it deals with moral universalism and subjectivism, and the reasons why 
Franks comes to reject them gives one a good grasp of why Franks would, therefore, most likely 
reject any appeals to essentialism no matter what it would constitute of.  
 
Franks (2008) presents through critically engaging with both classical anarchism and post-
anarchism’s meta-ethical presuppositions his own position which, Franks claims, is a synthesis of 
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classical anarchism’s moral universalism and post-anarchism’s moral subjectivism by taking the best 
features of them both while avoiding the possible perils included in such ethical positions. Firstly, 
Franks uses post-anarchistic criticism of classical anarchism’s meta-ethical positions to reject moral 
universalism, whether in realist or naturalist formulations, which is frequently associated to 
anarchism. Franks, following largely post-anarchist Saul Newman, discerns three issues which make 
anarchism and moral universalism unattainable meta-ethical stand for anarchism. These are 
disempowerment of agency, promotion of hierarchies and epistemological inadequacy. By 
disempowerment of agency is meant that moral universalism restricts moral subjects’ ability to create 
norms, not just choosing the perceived right from wrong as in traditional humanism. Promotion of 
hierarchies brought by moral universalism is based on the account that there are ‘rules which apply 
to all regardless of context ignore, and therefore disadvantage, those who are in an unequal position 
to begin with’ (Ibid., 142). Finally, epistemologically moral universalism is in its most vulnerable 
according to its critics, since such claims ultimately rely on constructions which are unknowable and 
untestable, beyond the grasp of critical examination. (Ibid., 140-144.) 
 
After positively referring to Newman’s post-anarchistic critique of moral universalism, heavily 
inspired by Max Stirner, Franks offers criticism to post-anarchism and particularly to its preferred 
meta-ethical position of subjectivism. Again, Franks discern three grave errors in post-anarchistic 
subjectivism: solipsism, recreation of social hierarchies and epistemological failure to recognise its 
own social embeddedness. Moral solipsism, which is at least implicitly exalted in post-anarchism 
through influence of Stirner and Nietzsche, makes critical debate of moral philosophy impossible, 
since only the self can be the source of moral knowledge and one can morally legitimise every 
conceivable action imagined, if one so wills. Post-anarchism’s commitment to the Stirnerian ego who 
is on the path of one’s own development towards liberated existence allows, and in order to able to 
distinguish one’s enlightened state implicitly even demands, ignorant mass as its counterpart, thus 
(re)creating hierarchises. Lastly, universally abstracted Stirnerian ego freed from the social order does 
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neglect grossly material and social circumstances in which such abstraction can come into being in 
the first place and one cannot abstract oneself from the surrounding world and not be part of it as was 
already shown by Marx in his criticism of Stirner (see e.g. chap. 5.2. in this thesis for Choat’s Marxist 
critique). (Franks 2008, 144-146.) 
 
From the criticism which Franks (2008) present for both moral universalism and subjectivism, which, 
as Franks also recognises (Ibid., 148), do fall to prey to similar criticisms with each other, albeit from 
different perspectives, he presents his own proposition as the needed meta-ethical stand which 
combines the best of universalism and subjectivism, that of practical, or prefigurative, anarchism 
based on the Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethical theory that places emphasis on the practices and 
internal goods provided by those practices, theory which he has since constructed in more detail in 
later works, especially in his article Anarchism and the Virtues (2010) (see chap. 2. and 3. in this 
thesis for elaboration of MacIntyre and Franks’ theories). What is most relevant here is Franks’ 
persistence of rejection of essentialism in any form, which he, as Newman and other post-anarchists, 
sees as inherently oppressive. This view of Franks is permeated throughout his writings (see e.g. 2008, 
136; 2007, 140; 2010, 144, 154-155). As Swann (2010b, 211; see also 5.1. in this thesis) analyses 
Franks posits moral universalism, thus essentialism at the same time, as diminishing agency and 
promoting hierarchies without consideration that universalism’s content could be described positively, 
aligned to the practical anarchism’s position of contesting hierarchies as the content of subscribed 
universalism. Besides narrow and inherently negative understanding of universalism, Franks position 
is locked to be anti-essentialist also in his strong conviction that there is no epistemologically 
convincing ‘methodology for discovering what constitutes humanity’s universal quintessence’ (2010, 
144), or failure to reach consensus amongst essentialists which form of essentialism to accept (Ibid.). 
These claims, alongside the insistence that essentialism inherently restricts revolutionary activity, 
show Franks’ unwillingness to change his view of essentialism and what that could be and mean. As 
I have argued above (see chap. 6.1.) there is an essentialism, that of materialism which constitutes 
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humanity’s universal quintessence and there is a consensus about that essentialism as the lived 
experience of our daily lives. Admittingly, materialism as essentialism is usually only implicitly 
recognised state of affairs which ought to become consciously recognised in order to have a real effect 
upon political and moral practices. This kind of transition could be described analogously in regard 
to Marxism as a change from materialism-in-itself to materialism-for-itself. Furthermore, Franks’ 
understanding of essentialism as a fixed and ahistorical is not particularly convincing either, as 
essentialism which would subscribe to naturalism and scientific facts, as materialism does, implies 
that evolution of species and life is ever changing and dynamic process where multiple factors 
influence the outcomes and directions which that development takes. That process’ status of being in 
constant flux, nevertheless, does not change that fact that it does ground its processes on materialist 
foundation. This being true in natural sciences it can only mean to be more relevant in social sciences 
because of their subject material of human individuals and communities to alter radically, if necessary, 
our living circumstances and structures. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that essentialism, at least 
in the form of materialism which I espouse, restricts possibility of change, when in fact it makes 
change intelligible and meaningful. Also, one of the most regrettable feature of post-anarchism for 
the anarchist, or in general to the libertarian socialist, canon has been its propensity to overlook class 
and economical factors in the struggles for emancipation and this is also duly noted by Franks (2007, 
136-138, see also above chap. 5). While Franks does voice his concern for negligence of economical 
inequalities brought by capitalism, here, perhaps more than elsewhere, is seen the weakness of Franks’ 
position for not embracing materialism since materialist deprivation and vulnerability tend to 
manifest itself in the economic sphere, i.e. poverty. Without the solid anchoring of his theory in 
materialist foundation which takes on a firm foundational level as a starting point our material 
constitution, I am doubtful of Franks’ theory’s capability to address sufficiently the strain put to our 
material subsistence under the capitalist system of production.   
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Above (see chap. 6.) I presented essentialism in the form of materialism as a needed amendment to 
Franks’ theory to make it appealing and meaningful theory for anarchism, but the large amount of 
argumentation and consistency of Franks for the vehement rejection of essentialism suggest that there 
is no place for essentialism in any form in Franks’ theory as it consciously positions itself against 
essentialism. Thus, it makes sense for me to distinguish my attempted amendment from Franks’ 
theory and use it as a basis for my own theory, which I would call materialist-virtue ethical anarchism, 
while recognising the strong influence of Franks’ practical anarchism. 
 
8. Further Paths of Inquiry 
 
Closely connected to the critical remarks is the further work which is to be done on development of 
materialist-virtue ethical anarchism. In this chapter I tentatively present some of the directions to go 
with in order to deepen the analysis regarding materialist-virtue ethical anarchism and conceptualise 
it into more fully fleshed out theory. Firstly, more thorough examination is needed of post-anarchism 
and particularly post-structuralism, which is another tradition of thought alongside anarchism 
constituting the formulation of post-anarchism. Here my conception of post-anarchism has been 
formed largely through the gaze of anarchist thinkers, who are not themselves post-anarchists, albeit 
ones who sees the value of the critique of classical anarchism presented by post-anarchists. Amongst 
the post-anarchist thinkers, the work of Todd May has been largely ignored here, partly because of 
Franks’ preference for Saul Newman’ s criticism of classical anarchism’s perceived essentialism. 
May’s post-anarchism offers a more complex and nuanced view of post-anarchism in contrast to 
Newman’s who focuses more on the question of essentialism. May, whose version of post-anarchism 
has been characterised as ‘tactical’ and dealing with considered sophistication around the question of 
power (Jun 2010, 48-49; see also May 1994) is, therefore, a post-anarchist thinker with whom I wish 
to engage more in the future. Moreover, the seminal works of thinkers often grouped together under 
a loose label of post-structuralists, such as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, have a lot to offer not 
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only through post-anarchists, but also their own original work. Foucault’s Nietzschean project of 
genealogy does have, or at least it can be interpreted to have, a verifiable materialist foundation, 
whether it is called contingent physicalism and/or micro-Marxism (Ojakangas 1998, 26), which does 
not seem to succumb to essentialism in any rigid sense, or it is certainly not Foucault’s aim. 
Furthermore, MacIntyre in his later period work Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990) takes 
Foucault to be the best successor of Nietzsche and his genealogy project which MacIntyre pits 
alongside encyclopaedical understanding characterised by ninth edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica 
against his favoured Thomism for the best theory to explicate moral enquiry. There MacIntyre clearly 
continues the work of After Virtue, especially its pivotal chapter 9 titled Nietzsche or Aristotle 
(1981/2014, 127-139) but reflecting the change of his thinking main stage is now taken by their finest 
disciples, at least in MacIntyre’s mind, Foucault and Aquinas. 
 
Another interesting road to examine in relation to my sketched theory of materialist-virtue ethical 
anarchism is the Frankfurt School. What strikes to me as a particularly shared concern is the need to 
carve a theory which is at the same time aimed towards emancipation, yet never closing itself off akin 
to a closed consciousness, since emancipatory theory in order to be such must always be open for 
new horizons instead of becoming stifled. This is clearly recognised in Theodor Adorno’s thought on 
moral philosophy and negative dialectics. The most obvious link between Frankfurt School and 
anarchism in general is Herbert Marcuse both in his writing criticising from a broadly, yet always 
committed, Marxist perspective cold war and their ideological bases, as well as in his role as one of 
the foremost figures of the New Left of the 1960s. As New Left did embrace many forms of new and 
older conceptions to revitalise socialism, so did Marcuse. While both Marcuse and anarchists, such 
as Murray Bookchin, rejected the label of anarchist for him, Marcuse, nevertheless, comes rather 
close to anarchistic positions in many of his writings, most clearly in One-Dimensional Man 
(1964/2002) where he condemns both capitalistic west and socialist east for repressing freedom and 
individuality in the name of ever-growing hold of bureaucratic power to increase production and 
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economic growth, echoing the shared goal of both anarchism and Marxism originating far before 
bureaucratic state socialism came to become the standard of socialist practice, that in ideal situation 
there would not be capitalism or states. Also, in relation to Hegel’s essence and existence and 
distinguishing the difference between them, Marcuse offers essence as something which enables to 
see the transcending qualities, yet unrealised potentialities in contrast to existence’s acceptance of 
reality principle, settling for things as they are; Former is characterised as negative thinking, while 
the latter is positive thinking (Kellner, 1984, 133-135). Such a definition of negative thinking is found 
also in Adorno as a crux of moral philosophy of which Adorno was famously reluctant to give any 
positive content emphasising the negative, which enables the emergence of new, unexpected even, 
possibilities to manifest themselves without confinement to the pre-determined and possibly 
restricting course of action (Kotkavirta 1999). 
 
9. Revolutionary Trinity: Anarchism, Materialism and Virtue Ethics 
 
For conclusion I will summarise the argument which I have presented in this thesis for materialist-
virtue ethical anarchism, and claim based on the inquiry I have conducted here that there is a case for 
a theory which explicitly combines anarchism, materialism and virtue ethics. As a starting point I 
took Alasdair MacIntyre’s highly influential virtue ethical account, and particularly the formation of 
it found in his book After Virtue (1981/2014), and Benjamin Franks’ theory of anarchism built around 
high degree of compatibility between anarchism and virtue ethics, especially that of MacIntyre’s 
during his After Virtue-era which emphasised practices as the most defining feature of virtue ethics. I 
identified the question of essentialism to be highly problematic for both of them and through that 
discovery came to conclude that in order to ground virtue ethical anarchism as developed by Franks, 
a strong anti-essentialist, more convincingly it needed essentialism as would, and has been the case 
historically from classical anarchism of the 19th century to post-anarchism of the 21st century, any 
anarchist theory which takes core anarchist values such as autonomy seriously. Insight illuminating 
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the ubiquitous nature of essentialism in the works of anarchist thinkers was provided by the work of 
Thomas Swann (see 2010a; above chap. 5.1.). I developed my theory of materialism as a necessary 
essentialism against MacIntyre’s later era embrace of Thomism and Thomistic essentialism. Then I 
looked into Franks’ inherent anti-essentialism in his theory and constructed out of it a counter-
argument against my explicitly essentialist standpoint and also acknowledged some of the alternative 
ethical conceptions to virtue ethics which can be taken in the context of anarchism. Finally, I 
addressed some of the future themes which could and should be examined in the forthcoming works 
in developing further materialist-virtue ethical anarchism. 
 
Vindicating materialism as an emancipatory and open, yet not an oppressive and closed, essentialism 
is needed for comprehensive and appealing theory and practice of anarchism. Swann’s criticism has 
acutely shown that deficiency in Franks’ otherwise invigorating and promising theory, is the lack of 
proper foundations for his theory, while at the same time claiming to reject relativism, while 
inadvertently falling prey to it. I have, like MacIntyre, brought essentialism to the theory, but unlike 
MacIntyre’s Thomistic turn, I have placed less demanding but practically unobjectionable ‘first 
principle’, materialism, to the foundational level of not only moral and political philosophy, but that 
of basis for all thinking and action, refocusing our attention to our shared material experience through, 
first and foremost, our bodies and its vulnerability and dependence of others. No matter how common 
sensical such approach would seem, it is crucial and comes naturally, so to speak without going here 
to discuss ambiguousness associated to the term, to us all in our being, so neglecting it is a grave error. 
Accepting explicitly materialism which I have been developing in this work, and this point I cannot 
stress enough, does not mean determinate reductionism, but makes conditions, in and through we live, 
recognised more fully, enabling us to make better decisions. And those decisions I would suggest 
ought to be according to principles of anarchist, or more broadly speaking libertarian socialist, 
theoretical tradition opposing hierarchies and building truly equalitarian, not only in form and but 
also in content, alternatives to contemporary liberal-democratic capitalism which places priority 
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solely to the external goods, such as economic wealth and growth. Franks has argued, rather 
convincingly in my opinion, virtue ethical prefiguration and practices are integral to achieve such 
alternatives which places importance to the practices’ internal goods, such as social justice and 
equality. However, such endeavour, I claim, can only be meaningfully, and with large mass appeal, 
generated with a sound essentialism making intelligible those enterprises by grounded understanding 
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